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1. Introduction 
 
As early as in 1974, at the meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, a 
Recommendation had already been adopted on the role of the ombudsman and the 
parliamentary commissioner, taking into account the ombudsman and the parliamentary 
commissioner as (for) the protection of individuals against the authorities and in principle to 
promote good governance. It pointed out that the citizens’ lives are increasingly governed by 
the authorities, and where the protection of fundamental rights are supervised by the state, the 
interferences of public authorities into the lives of individuals threaten their fundamental 
rights. It stated that the usual forms of judicial remedies are not always able to react with the 
necessary speed and efficiency to the problems and to the complexity of different fields of the 
administration; thus there is a need for a further guarantee, which is simpler, quicker, cheaper 
and more efficient, and this could be provided by the ombudsman.
1
 Furthermore, in another 
Recommendation adopted in 1985, the Council of Ministers affirmed this view “…to consider 
extending and strengthening the powers of Ombudsmen in other ways so as to encourage the 
effective observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the functioning of the 
administration”. 
The office of the European ombudsman was established in connection with European 
citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty. European citizenship was needed because the early 
period of European integration gave no role to citizens and, for the deepening of integration, 
a sort of identification and means of demonstrating a European ‘added value’ were required2 
and offered a direct connection between the Union and the citizen. Arising from the European 
citizenship, any European citizen or any natural or legal person residing or having registered 
at an office in a Member State of the Union may, directly or through a Member of the 
European Parliament, refer a complaint to the Ombudsman in respect of an instance of 
maladministration in the activities of Community institutions or bodies, with the exception of 
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance acting in their judicial role. As we look at 
the term maladministration, a complex of procedural obligations can be observed between the 
EU administration and the public. Although in different ways, the definition of good 
administrative practices (good administrative behaviour) has been used by European law since 
the 1960s, enshrined through the activities of the European Court of Justice.3 Since the first 
annual report of the European Ombudsman, he or she has constantly represented the view that 
three types of errors may give rise to an instance of maladministration and which may even to 
some extent partly cover each other. These types can be identified as a failure to comply with 
a legal norm or principle, failure to perform  the principle of good administration and failure 
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to respect human and fundamental rights. For example, the European Ombudsman often 
referred in the past during his or her investigations to Article F of the Maastricht Treaty, 
which ordered the Community institutions and bodies to respect fundamental rights. We 
should mention the opinion of the Court of First Instance which stated that the principle of 
sound administration, does not, in itself, confer rights upon individuals except where it 
constitutes the expression of specific rights such as the right to have affairs handled 
impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time, the right to be heard, the right to have access 
to files, or the obligation to give reasons for decisions, for the purposes of Article 41 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed on 7 December 2000 in 
Nice.4 
Classical ombudsmen do not have an express mandate for human rights protection and 
promotion, however, the violation of human rights by government institutions and bodies as 
maladministration falls within their mandate and thus the European ombudsman, as a true 
classical ombudsman in the international or supranational level, uses human rights norms that 
are part of the applicable legal system and applies them in human rights related cases.5  
 
2. Legal background 
 
According to the EU ombudsman, in order to prevent an instance of maladministration, the 
practice of good administration should be followed. We can see in the office’s case-law that 
after an own-initiative inquiry was conducted in 1998 – where the subject matter was the 
correct procedure determining the relation between the public officials of Community bodies 
and institutions – to clarify the term of good administrative procedure, the so-called European 
Code of Good Administrative Behaviour was prepared. The investigation was initiated 
because of complaints where the offences could have been avoided with a clear and public 
record of the obligations of the Community officials. I shall point out that the Code can be 
seen as one of the achievements of the original intentions regarding the establishment of the 
office: the Union’s commitment to a more accountable and transparent administration. Thus, 
the institutions and their officials are obliged to respect and to follow the principles of good 
administrative conduct laid down in this code. However, I see the effects of this code in two 
directions. First, the code gives the opportunity to the official to avoid an instance of 
maladministration. Second, European citizens who are familiar with the code, can require 
from the official during the administrative procedure the basic principles set out in it.  
We shall point out that in the Finnish Constitution the concept of good administrative 
behaviour and thus the procedural guarantees cumulated in the behaviour are constitutionally 
protected as fundamental right and that it is no coincidence that the first European Ombudsman, 
Jacob Söderman who had before the office of the Finnish Ombudsman also wanted that a 
similar fundamental right should be included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.6 
Also, the Ombudsman published ethical standards form of five public service principles 
in 2012 as a guide for the EU administration. These are: commitment to the European Union 
and its citizens, integrity, objectivity, respect for others and transparency. 
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The right to good administrative procedure embodied in the code has been formulated 
into the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as a right enjoyed by the 
European citizens: the right to good administration in Article 417 and the right to refer to the 
European Ombudsman in Article 43.8 The importance of the Charter of Fundamental Rights is 
confirmed by the fact that it has been incorporated into the draft European Constitution. In the 
preliminary draft constitutional treaty an article on citizenship of the Union was included. 
Among the new rights was the right to complain to the ombudsman as a new forum for legal 
redress. It followed the idea that this new forum would contribute to the achievement of an 
open, reliable and service oriented government.  Yet before the Charter became legally 
binding, the ombudsman stated that the violation of the rights in the Charter constitutes 
maladministration.  
 
3. The subject of inquiry: maladministration 
 
In the provisions regarding the European Ombudsman, we cannot find any further 
specification what they understand of the term of maladministration. It is only referred to in 
the Treaty and the Statute to the extent that the Ombudsman examines instances of 
maladministration. It is established that maladministration occurs, when an EU institution 
does not act in accordance with the Community law, or neglects or fails to take account of the 
principles and rules created by the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. 
The uncertainty surrounding of the definition of maladministration made the European 
Ombudsman offer a further clarification in the Annual Report of 1995,
9
 stating that many 
other things may also amount to maladministration, including administrative irregularities, 
administrative omissions, abuse of power, negligence, unlawful procedures, unfairness, 
malfunction or incompetence, discrimination, avoidable delay and the lack or refusal of 
information. In 1997, it was further clarified as ‘maladministration occurs when a public body 
fails to act in accordance with a rule or principle which is binding upon it’ and this definition 
was adopted by a 1998 European Parliament decision. 
Regarding the European Parliament, limits of maladministration can be determined by 
the European Parliament’s political power. The classical Ombudsman offices have been 
established within the frame of the parliament to control the administration, and not for the 
supervision of the parliament’s legislative or other work. Although the situation cannot be 
fully compared to the European level, the activities of the European Parliament cannot be 
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considered as administrative activities, thus complaints in connection with the European 
Parliament and its Committee on Petitions’ political activity are to be considered 
inadmissible. Therefore, for example in complaint 420/9.2.96/PLM/B, the alleged 
maladministration, namely poor administration by the Committee on Petitions, the handling of 
the petitions was more of a political issue than maladministration: as the right to petition laid 
down in the Treaty has a constitutional value, the Parliament’s responsibility is to organize its 
services so it can perform its institutional functions.
10
 Similarly, the decision of the European 
Parliament about the French nuclear tests in the Pacific was inadmissible because it concerned 
a political decision.
11
 
As we cannot see a clear division of legislative and executive powers at European level, 
so the European office does not meet the traditional image of Ombudsman ordered to the 
legislative power,
12
 and although basically he or she is a Parliamentary Ombudsman, the 
supervision is extended as well to the Parliament. Nevertheless, this control is limited: as 
complaints in connection with activities or decisions with rather political than administrative 
nature are not considered to be admissible, hence the Committee on Petitions cannot be 
supervised by the Ombudsman as its activities belong to the Parliament’s political actions. 
 
4. The decision-making of the Ombudsman 
 
In cases, where the Ombudsman finds maladministration at the end of the inquiry and there is 
still a possibility to redress the maladministration by the institution, body, office or agency 
concerned, or the maladministration is of general nature or more serious, the Ombudsman 
informs the institution concerned and the complainant about her or his finding with a report 
and a draft recommendation. If the Ombudsman’s draft recommendation is not accepted 
within the time-frame, it is refused, or the institution concerned cannot find any other 
acceptable solution, or the Ombudsman does not find the detailed opinion satisfactory then 
the Ombudsman has authority to make a special report.
13
 This report is submitted to the 
European Parliament, the concerned institutions and the complainant, in which the instance of 
maladministration is reviewed and a recommendation
14
 can be laid down, too. In this case 
emphasis is on the European Parliament, because it can help to resolve the situation: using the 
decisions of the Parliament to accept the recommendation and call upon the institution to 
solve the problem.
15
 The significance of the aforementioned is strengthened by the fact that 
the competence of the European Ombudsman is quite limited, because an Ombudsman 
decision has no binding power.
16
 This means that if there is no problem-solving solution 
between the concerned institutions and the complainant, the Ombudsman turns to the last and 
most significant means: using the help of another institution. The importance of a special 
report is that the concerned institution’s political adjudication is at stake. The first special 
report−concerning the public access of documents−was submitted to the Parliament in 1997 
and the case ended successfully.
17
 The special report has no legal effects ‘…vis-à-vis third 
parties within the meaning of Art. 173 of the Treaty (ex Art. 230 TEC) and is not binding to 
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the Parliament’, as stated by the Court of First Instance in Case T-103/99. Indeed, the 
Parliament is ‘…free to decide, within the framework of the powers conferred on it by the 
Treaty, what steps are to be taken in relation to it’.18 Therefore, the Parliament can freely 
decide to adopt a decision about the Ombudsman’s recommendation, namely, adopting a 
decision the Parliament calls upon the concerned institution to settle the case. Regarding the 
European Ombudsman’s other reporting obligation as stated in Art. 228 of TFEU (ex Art. 195 
TEC) and Art. 3(8) of Decision 94/262 of the European Parliament, neither the annual report 
has binding effect to the Parliament, but in the frame of the annual report the Ombudsman has 
the opportunity to give general observations regarding the conduct of the institutions’.19;20 
 
5. Competition law: as a field of subject 
 
According to the statistics, 70 % of the complaints concern the European Commission, which 
can be explained by the fact that it is the main European institution which has the most direct 
link with European citizens. The types of maladministration are alleged breach or breach of 
duties relating to the following: absence of discrimination [Article 5 ECGAB]
21
, requests for 
public access to documents [Article 23 ECGAB]
22
, duty of care (incorrect application of 
substantive and/or procedural rules) [Article 4 ECGAB]
23
, duty to state the grounds of 
decisions and the possibilities of appeal [Articles 18 and 19 ECGAB]
24
, requests for 
information [Article 22 ECGAB]
25
, legitimate expectations, consistency and advice [Article 
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10 ECGAB]
26
, lawfulness (incorrect application of substantive and/or procedural rules) 
[Article 4 ECGAB]
27
, impartiality, independence and objectivity [Articles 8 and 9 ECGAB]
28
, 
fairness [Article 11 ECGAB]
29
, notification of the decision [Article 20 ECGAB]
30
, reasonable 
time-limit for taking decisions [Article 17 ECGAB]
31
. 
Regarding the subject matters of complaints in the field of competition policy, the main 
group is related to the infringement proceeding of the EU Commission, where a decision to 
close an infringement case can involve maladministration if the Commission fails to explain 
its decision, or takes into account irrelevant matters.
32
 This can be explained by a 1997 own-
initiative inquiry against the EU Commission’s infringement procedure based on Article 258 
of the TFEU (ex Article 226 of the EC Treaty). The ex officio inquiry was necessary because 
of the many complaints in relation with the administrative side of the infringement procedure. 
They were mainly about the delay of complaint handling, lack of information (about the 
stages of the procedure), lack of reasoning (when the Committee adopted the view that the 
member state had not infringed community law). The own-initiated inquiry was already 
proposed in 1996, when closing two complaints (complaints regarding the UK’S M40 motor 
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drive and the Newbury Bypass) he stated that without prejudice to the question of whether the 
principles of Community law might require more developed procedural rights for private 
complainants under Article 169, the Commission could itself decide to create such rights as a 
matter of good administrative behaviour, consistent with the case-law of the Court of Justice 
and Court of First Instance that individuals cannot challenge the Commission's decision not to 
open infringement proceedings
33
, and an administrative process of this kind normally 
concludes with a reasoned decision communicated to those who have participated in the 
process
34
.  
The Ombudsman’s power extends to the examination of procedural rights. But what if, 
according to the complainant, the violation of procedural rights affects the final decision and 
the Ombudsman accepts the complainant’s allegations? The EU Ombudsman points out that 
the Commission has not yet clarified the matter and made the decision without this. In this 
case the EU Ombudsman’s opinion deals not only with the procedural part but indirectly with 
the substantive part, too. Indeed, if the complainant’s allegations are true, the Ombudsman 
calls upon the Commission to establish a new procedure saying ‘good administrative practice 
would therefore at least have required the Commission to try and ascertain’, which means at 
the end the review of the prior decision.
35
 
Many competition complaints concern the issue of transparency, as the ombudsman also 
dealt with complaints from companies and other legal entities concerning anti-trust 
investigations and other cases related to the Commission’s competition policy as in a case 
when the Commission had an electronic copy of an internal e-mail of a competitor that it 
claimed was crucial evidence but did not release the e-mail until just over a month before 
fining the cartel, and yet it had had the e-mail for six months. The Commission’s explanation 
about the delay did not convince the Ombudsman, and the Commission’s conduct had been 
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criticized.
36
 However, the Commission does acknowledge in many cases that a procedure has 
not been totally transparent and negotiates with the complainant with a view to resolve the 
issue amicably.
37
 
Complaints concern the area of institutional or policy matters too, with alleged 
procedural errors made by the Commission during an anti-trust investigation, e.g. when the 
Commission failed to take minutes of a meeting despite the fact that the meeting directly 
concerned the subject-matter of the Commission's investigation.
38
 
However, the Ombudsman takes into consideration the discretion power of the 
Commission as to whether or not to commence proceedings on the basis of a competition as 
e.g in a complaint about the Commission’s failure to respect EC competition rules by not 
opening an investigation on the basis of his complaint and alleged deficiencies in the 
Commission's letter-handling policy.
39
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 In case 1935/2008/FOR the Ombudsman received a complaint from Intel. The complaint alleged procedural 
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in a telephone call of 30 August 2007 between senior representatives of Dell and senior Commission 
representatives. However, since the Commission had not made any contemporaneous notes of the content of that 
telephone call, the available evidence was not sufficient for the Ombudsman to take a position as to whether 
Dell, or the Commission, had first suggested the agreement. The Ombudsman did not, therefore, make any 
finding of maladministration as regards the complainant's second allegation. However, the Ombudsman 
recommended that, in the future, proper internal notes should be made of the content of meetings or telephone 
calls with third parties concerning important procedural issues. 
39
 In case 1142/2008/(BEH)KM the complainant, a German citizen, wrote to the European Commission asking it 
to commence competition proceedings against E.ON and the Würzburg public utility company. He highlighted 
that the latter had not protested against price increases made by E.ON, which delivers gas to this company and 
also has an indirect minority stake in it. In its reply, the Commission's Directorate-General for Competition (DG 
COMP) outlined that it shared the complainant's concerns about competition in the German energy markets but 
did not intend to open proceedings on the basis of his complaint. Further letters were exchanged before the 
complainant turned to the European Ombudsman. In his complaint to the Ombudsman, the complainant alleged 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
According to the Lisbon Treaty ‘…the Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principle set 
out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union … which shall have the 
same legal value as the Treaties’.40 The commitment to the binding nature of the Charter in the 
Lisbon Treaty reflects the gradual understanding that citizens should be placed at the heart of 
the European issues which shows the success of the European Ombudsman as well. We wish 
to underline, however, that the Charter was the first international legal document with explicit 
declaration of the right to good administration. 
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essentially argued that the conduct of the Würzburg public utility company had no effect on cross-border trade 
and as regards the conduct of E.ON, the Commission had a discretion to prioritise other options of working 
towards increased competition in the German energy markets rather than those proposed by the complainant. 
The Ombudsman considered that the Commission's position concerning the conduct of the Würzburg public 
utility company was correct. He also found that the Commission was right in arguing that it had discretion as to 
whether or not to commence proceedings on the basis of a competition complaint. In the Ombudsman's view, the 
Commission acted within the limits of its discretion when deciding not to open an investigation regarding 
E.ON’s conduct. Furthermore, the Ombudsman noted that, although the Commission's reply to one of the 
complainant's letters was delayed, DG COMP apologised for this fact. Finally, the Ombudsman held that there 
were no grounds to carry out further inquiries into the Commission's handling of the complainant's other 
correspondence. 
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